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ABSTRACT  
Man and world look like residuals: human being is an organic remnant relic), as the survivor of a 
process of self alienation, in which the machine has been elected as a despot; world (or nature) is 
exhausted in the attempt to maintain a balance. The contemporary massive technological 
development seems supported by the idea that man is a Homo faber authorized to operate on 
nature without limits. This is the idea of a superior being with a dominant role in the world. The 
Judaic-Christian tradition has certainly promoted this idea; but it reproduces in another 
dimension the relations typical of the greek oikos: not justice, but authority and subordination 
for advantage the “head of the family”. Renouncing to want own the Earth (like an ordinary 
thing) can perhaps open the way for a new ethic. 
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After centuries of traveling together through history, the relationship between 
mankind and nature has generated two distinctly different residues. On the one 
hand, an organic remnant as the survivor of a process of self alienation, in which 
the machine has been elected, perhaps definitively, as absolute despot. On the 
other hand, nature limps on exhausted, abused, and sometimes dramatically 
violent, like an agonizing body. Both residues are heading in the same direction, 
and it is the hand of man that irresistibly guides the way. It has always been man, 
with his productive impulse, his unstoppable creative vision, that opened the path 
for the advent of machinery, but that same  technology has itself brought about 
an unexpected acceleration in its own development. 
That man is characterized as faber (or ‘creator’ according to taste) more than 
any other being on earth, has been suggested for some time. The idea that  human 
action can be defined as the essential feature of the last century has  been 
vigorously upheld, and with valid reasons, by the philosopher and sociologist 
Arnold Gehlen. In his volume “Man. His Nature and Place in the World” 1  he 
sustains that man is affected by a series of fundamental biological deficiencies that 
                                                 
1 A. Gehlen. Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1940) trans. by C. Mainoldi 
‘L’uomo, la sua natura e il posto nel mondo’ Milano, Feltrinelli 1983; now trans. by C. Mainoldi, 
edited by V. Rasini, Milano, Mimesis 2010 
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leave him devoid of the main morphological and instinctual devices required for 
survival. This leaves him exposed to “a profusion of stimuli which are completely 
alien to animal nature”, and forces him to “find his own defenses (Entlastungen) 
with his own tools and actions”, and to “transform conditions of deficit in his 
existence into the opportunity to preserve his life.”2 In order to escape from the 
secular problem of a presumed duality between man and nature, Gehlen proposes 
resigning any claim to demonstrating  spirituality, and  dismisses  the problem of 
the relationship between body and soul, in all its different forms. Gehlen poses the 
question as to whether it is possible to set aside all  metaphysical issues and a 
large part of the speculative tradition of western thought, and adopt a different 
key theme for the study of man. Should this starting point be one that strongly 
adheres to empirical reality and that can be attested in the observation of facts?  
“With such a starting point” he concludes, “the principal role is played by action, 
that is, by the concept of man as a being, first and foremost, of agency.” 3 
It goes without saying this action will have a very specific connotation, must 
not be confused with that of other living beings, and must be identified with 
human nature without any possibility of doubt. The concept of action, Gehlen 
states clearly, designates “the activity directed towards the modification of nature 
in view of the purposes of man.” 4 The very marked intervention on nature helps 
man obtain an environment, for creating an ‘existential context’ in which he can 
find adequate conditions for survival, which, according to Gehlen, man certainly 
cannot find in nature”. It is through technical action (because this is the 
substance) that develops on different levels of existence (private, work, linguistic, 
symbolic-imaginative, etc.) that man is able to transfer himself into the cultural 
dimension and to structure his own life path step by step (a worthy descendent of 
Prometheus), using tools and methods which are always new and powerful in 
effect.  
In a similar representation, the cultural dimension is separated and distanced 
from that of the dimension of nature to the extent that man is different from 
animals. The concept of nature encompasses the idea of animalism (and 
brutality), of organic needs. The concept of culture instead extends into the 
human universe as spiritually equipped, creative, imaginative, noble, free, and 
unique. Culture sublimates and redirects life’s requirements, conceding to man the 
privilege of variety of design: the options available for human survival are neither 
numerically or qualitatively inferior to the possibilities of the imagination. 
This is Gehlen’s view (and not only his), and he underlines that human action, 
and therefore  the way in which Man intervenes morally with nature, depends 
                                                 
2 Ibid. p. 74. 
3 A. Gehlen, Anthropologische Forschung. Zur Selbstbegegnung und Selbstentdeckung des Menschen 
(1961), trans. by S. Cremaschi, Prospettive Antropologiche. L’uomo alla scoperta di sé, edited by 
V. Rasini, Bologna, il Mulino, p. 33. 
4 Ibid. 
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mainly on the way in which this being understands himself. “The need [...] to 
interpret one’s own human existence, he sustains, is not merely a theoretical need. 
According to the decisions implicit in such an interpretation, certain tasks are 
made visible or are hidden. That man is understood to be a creature of God or as a 
‘successful’ monkey implies a clear difference in his behavior towards the facts of 
reality; in the two cases he will obey imperatives which are in themselves very 
different”5.  The various visions of the world, the mythological and religious 
conceptions, all human knowledge, is always conditioned to some extent by the 
image that man has of himself, by the relationship that he believes he must or can 
have with other living creatures and with the universe. It is an anthropological 
conception, inclusive of an idea of provenance and destination, and any behavior 
derives from this point of view.  
Throughout history many, often contrasting images of man have emerged, 
but within the limits of western culture at least one constant element can clearly 
be identified, characterizing man’s image of himself for centuries (and apparently 
still the case). This is the idea of a superior being authorized to play a dominant 
role in the world. The Judaic-Christian tradition has certainly favored this idea: 
the Holy Scriptures paint a picture of a man created in the image and likeness of 
God, superior therefore to any other being, and to whom the world has literally 
been given. From this starting point it is a short step to considering himself 
undisputed  master of the world, playing this role unscrupulously to ensure his 
own interests are always satisfied.  
As regards this image of mankind, certain reflections on the concept of oikos  
are interesting. The widely used term “ecology” is derived from this ancient Greek 
word, coined in the second half of the 19th century by the English biologist Ernst 
Haeckel, and with the sense of a science of relationships which involve organisms 
and environment. Considered according to its main meaning, oikos does not refer 
so much to the environment in the sense of ‘surrounding space’ or ‘place around’ 
(...) like, on the other hand, the German term Umwelt. Instead it means a precise 
system of relationships. In fact oikos means “ home”, “family” (and by extension 
domestic heritage or ‘substance’) and it involves the management of one’s own 
environment, of something that ‘belongs’ to the person governing it. The main 
aspect of this concept therefore embraces an ‘owned’ (thing/house), an owner, and 
certain rules of inter-relationship .  
Within the Aristotelian conception, oikos is the place in which the authority 
of a master is exercised over his slaves, as well as over his wife and children 
(although to different degrees). It is not a place in which justice can be upheld: 
justice in the full sense can only be dispensed between equals, for example free 
                                                 
5 A. Gehlen. L’uomo, cit. pg. 45. 
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citizens of the polis6. However, the polis is a different  domain, in which women, 
slaves, and children effectively do not take part. They do not participate in the 
government of the public sphere as family heads do. Due to their servile condition 
slaves do not enjoy political rights, women are considered ”naturally inferior and 
in need of guidance”, children are unqualified for the exercise of political virtue 
until they are able to obtain an oikos, and so become a family head. According to 
Aristotle, within the sphere of the oikos, authority directly pursues the interest of 
the householder and only accidentally the interests  of those under his authority 
(because it is clear that damage to property always ends up being damage to the 
owner)7. It is therefore characteristic of domestic despotism that the master has 
primarily his own good in mind and puts that of the others in his domain in 
second place. The opposite would be an aberration. It would be anomalous and 
almost perverse to put the good of the owned, the interest of the subjects first, 
completely overturning the established order of  a balanced system dependent on 
the specific nature of the related elements.8 Instead it is concerned with the 
regulation of certain subjects “according to nature” and therefore taken for 
granted, obviously in this sense ”right” (but wrong and deviant if appearing in the 
public sphere under the form of tyranny). In  this governing structure, the aim is 
the conservation of the family domain itself and of its organization, the 
preservation therefore of a certain power hierarchy: “relationships emerge which 
establish precise reciprocal positions between the members of the oikos, ritualizing 
roles within a fixed property”.9 The transmission of rules comes through 
commands, because, “the collocation of a being, whether animate or inanimate 
within a relationship of command constitutes the very basis of its own 
existence.”10 It justifies and gives meaning to a being’s presence in the oikos. 
Within this sphere, the oikmonia environment, only powerful authoritarian 
relationships and those of dependency can be found.11 
Talking of oikos, Hannah Arendt offers other points for consideration. In her 
book, ‘Vita activa’ she focuses on power, both absolute and unchallenged, which 
throughout western antiquity the pater familias has held over his own home (his 
dominus). The distinction between public and private spheres marks the distance 
between the place of life preservation (of the individual and of the species) and the 
practice of  political functions, participating freely in the government (in the 
                                                 
6 See for example, the study by F. Calabi, La città del oikos. La politica di Aristotole, Lucca, 
Maria Pacini Fazzi edition. 1984, pg. 50 
7 Aristotle Politica, 1278 b, 34 
8 Cf. F. Calabi, La città dell oikos, cit. pgs. 19-20. 
9 Ibid., pg.67 
10 Ibid. pg. 68 
11 Cf. ibid. 74-75 
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scope of the polis)12.  The “ pre-political force” of the head of the family held the 
strings of domestic power, acting as a social glue at the centre of the nucleus and 
at the same time it guaranteed  the sacred confines of property, which were 
indispensable for entry into the public dimension, the reserve only of free men.13  
The nature of the sphere of patronal power and dominion of inequality is repeated 
for the family and Arendt underlines how, in the oikos, the use of force and 
violence is justified in the case of valid needs (conservative, biological, 
reproductive, etc.)14 and how  the sense of the rigidity of that order is exhausted 
within a precise private and well defined context. Now, Arendt continues, through 
the course of history there has been an extension of the domestic community and 
its organizational norms into the public sphere, including those “economic 
activities” which were previously conducted within the family sphere, becoming 
an increasingly collective issue, until, “in the modern world”, she argues in her 
expressive style, “the two domains converge constantly one with the other, like 
waves on an incessant current of the same life process.”15 
It could possibly be sustained that a similar process of expansion and 
reproduction in the organization of the private domain has gradually embraced 
even the vast sphere of nature. We assume a generic concept of nature, as the set 
of beings and things which subsist independently of  the existence of man (and of 
which man is not directly and uniquely the cause). An alternative is the proposal 
of Aristotle in his Fisica, when “nature is found in animals, and their parts, in the 
plants and basic elements, such as, for example, earth, fire, air and water”.16 
In relation to these ‘beings of nature’ our behavior has assumed the 
characteristics of dominion over the subjects within it. As already stated, Judaic-
Christian thought has certainly favored the idea of man who is entitled, (perhaps 
even obliged) to behave as the absolute lord over the earth, over a flora and fauna 
which is inferior to him in every way.17 Man is authorized to “assign names”, 
marking every being as his property, establishing a hierarchy and dependence 
between beings, just as he is also authorized to exploit, consume, and squander.  
Within this view it makes no sense to imagine a duty to preserve the elements of 
nature in themselves, given as they were to man to rule over. The sole interest 
                                                 
12 According antiquated thinking  the expression ‘political economy’ is an aberration: the 
organizational modes of the domestic sphere of the oikos have nothing to do with politics, with 
the management of the public domain.  
13 H. Arendt, The human condition (1958) translation by S. Finzi, Vita activa. La condizione 
umana, introduction by A. Dal Lago, Milano , Bompiani, 2003, pgs. 23-24.  
14 Ibid. pg. 23 
15 Ibid. pg. 25 
16 Aristotle, Fisica II, i, 192b (translation by L. Raggiu, Milano, Rusconi, 1995). 
17 In the 1960s L. White Jr. brought linked the causes of contemporary ecological crisis to the 
Judeo-Christian concept of the world: The historical roots of our Ecological Crisis, “ Science” 
1967, vol. 155 pgs. 1203-1207 
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that can and must be pursued is that of the being gifted with reason, or indeed 
spirit, with an immortal soul. Man can only fulfill the interests of other beings of 
nature accidentally, since protection and care for the elements of the natural 
context  always comes second to the interests of man himself, as he enjoys specific 
advantages, but is aware that he might subsequently suffer for his damage.  
The protection of human interests is not limited to the maintenance of a 
status quo, of the possibilities of a delicate but superior species, or the survival of 
a being, naked and biologically devoid of defenses to the threat of a violent and 
forceful nature. It is not about the simple protection of human beings from 
continual aggression from the outside, but above all the wellbeing of the master. 
He who is  strong in the knowledge that his own position and the availability of 
effective tools ensures continuous improvement in his own conditions of life. 
Effectively, why not progress? During the centuries of the so-called scientific 
revolution, the idea that the development of knowledge and the application of 
technology would progressively free man from need and permit the domestication 
of the hostile forces of nature has always been pervasive. (This long sequence 
begins with Francis Bacon and leads on to the heart of positivism and beyond, 
passing through optimistic scientists like John B.S. Haldane and onwards until 
our present day18). 
In relatively recent times, Hans Jonas, greatly insisted on the profound 
change that happened in the relationship between man and nature on the basis of 
the idea of progress. In the past, oppressed by need and exhausted by fatigue, 
man proudly offended nature by carving out an artificial space, a protected 
enclave, relatively free from natural tyranny, within which he could  establish a 
system of autonomous laws and hope for a more acceptable existence. The chorus 
in Sophocles’ Antigone, considered to be an antique symbol for action, gives 
homage to the ability of man  to use  force and ingenuity, but in describing his 
work does not hide the arrogance of his eruption into nature, the profane violence 
of his invasion19. “The profanation of nature and the civilization of humanity go 
hand in hand.”20  Jonas affirms. But in this antique representation, man still 
remains fearful and reverent, his technology does not hurt nature to the core and 
the offense does not really damage, he remains substantially innocuous. With his 
incursions, man does not change the natural equilibrium and is limited to 
                                                 
18 F. Bacon., Nuovo organo, Milano, Bompiani, 2002; J.B.S. Haldane, Daedalus, or Science and 
Future (1924), Italian translation Dedalo o la Scienza e  il futuro; Icaro o il futuro della scienza, 
edited by M. Nacci, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991.  
19 H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik fur die technologische Zivilisation 
(1979), Italian translation Il principio responsabilità. Un eticà per la società tecnologica, Torino, 
Enaudi, 1990, pgs. 4-5; and Technologie e responsabilità. Riflessioni sui nuovi compiti dell’etica 
(1972), in  Frontiere della vita, frontiere della tecnica, edited by V. Rasini, Bologna, il Mulino 
2011, pgs. 125.  
20 Ibid. pg. 127 
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maintaining the domain of necessity for his own life, conquering small spaces for 
survival. “The invulnerability of everything  of which man’s disturbances can 
only scratch the surface, that is the fundamental immutable  character of Nature 
in the cosmic order, was in truth the background of all business of mortal man, 
including his intromissions in this same order”21. The profound mutation that 
occurred over the centuries with the strengthening of technology produced a 
radical transformation of the ways and ability of man to intervene in nature. It 
concerns not only an increase in the incursions and their greater penetration, 
because modern technology has introduced a range of intervention and objectives 
which are so new as to be unimaginable in the past, and even the quality and the 
consequences of this aggression to nature have undergone a notable evolution. In 
fact, the change regards principally the balance of power and only indirectly its 
extension: while nature once represented a great danger against which man had to 
deploy forces, it now exhibits a critical vulnerability which was previously 
unimaginable. “This discovery”, affirms Jonas, “was surprising enough to lead to 
the concept and birth of ecology, even modifying the idea that we have of 
ourselves as a causal element within the widest system of things.”22  
All this should at least lead one to rethink the behavior that man can or must 
assume  towards nature. The extraordinary technological developments of 
contemporary times have resulted in a change that directly effects the impact of 
dominant human behavior (provided that man really can be defined as 
‘dominant’) over the natural world. As even Jonas underlines, this development 
has undergone an incredible acceleration in the direction of growth, in the increase 
of technological  strengthening (or self strengthening). Technologicalisation and 
mechanization (to quote Anders) are therefore at once the result  and the means of 
the process of affirmation of man over his own earthly  possessions. This phase of 
growth-development23 determines a progressive and significant substitution of the 
natural with the artificial, of the organic with the inorganic24, a process leading to 
a dual outcome. On the one hand the monopoly over the world by man (in reality 
by his technological culture) and a loss of autonomy of nature. On the other hand 
                                                 
21  
22 Ibid. pg. 133 
23 The idea of socio-economic development is always linked to that of growth. Only the concept 
of sustainable development proposes an attempt at substituting growth with conservation. 
However, as we know, it is a fairly recent concept. For an analysis of this concept see, S. 
Latouche, Survivre au developpement (2004), Italian translation  by F. Grillenzoni Come 
sopravvivere allo sviluppo. Dalla decolonizzazione del’immaginario economico alla costruzione di 
una societa alternativa, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2005, pg. 30 
24 This process has been underlined by Gehlen particularly in the volume: Die Seele im 
thechnische Zeitalter (1957), Italian translation L’uomo nell’era della tecnica, edited by M.T. 
Pansera, Roma, Armando 2003; however, G. Anders has revealed even more aberrant aspects: 
see Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen vol. 2 (1956 and 1980), Italian translation, L’uomo è 
antiquato, vol. 2, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2003, particularly vol. 1, part 1 pgs. 55.  
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the incorporation of man into a machine system which brings about the total 
alienation of his being from the biological anthropological dimension. 25 
In order to better understand what happens in this phase of overbearing 
expansion of the “cultural” domain and to achieve an accurate interpretation of 
current human conditions, it is useful to recall the view of Gunther Anders. 
According to his reading of the contemporary, it is perfectly appropriate to pose 
the anthropological question in residual terms: “ What remains of man and of the 
world?”. Man has delegated to machines the role of protagonists in the modern 
world, he has acknowledged in them the perfection that no organic equipment 
could ever achieve, and he has abdicated the Promethean role of future planner,  
kneeling to the superiority of technology, to its strength and resistance, to its 
dynamics of autonomisation and force. Man is unsuited to the socio-economic 
dynamics that overwhelm him (the mega machine), and so is ontologically 
antiquated, has lost his grip on the world and on any real claim of possessing it, 
which has passed definitively into the power of the machine. No surprise then, 
that the outlook is the redefinition of man as a being  “without a world”: he is 
consigned to the dynamics of the socio economic process and is by now seen only 
as an unconscious gear in an auto-productive system, which is subtle and perhaps 
unstoppable. He has shown a profound ineptitude in terms of management and 
his ability to control growth (which is nevertheless still sought after). This 
culpable incapacity in the face of his own technological products, this polyhedral 
“Promethean de-leveling” (which condemns him to  inferiority, perhaps 
irrecoverably), this chronic and resigned inadequacy drags man to the edge of a 
very profound abyss:  a world which could exist without man.  Perhaps this is not 
even the worst  scenario, it could be that together with man all forms of life might 
disappear (e.g. following a nuclear catastrophe). 26  
What should be done then in the face of such an outlook? Firstly, it is better 
to avoid taking minimizing or sardonic  stances, which are generally poorly 
disguised  behind a facade of arrogance, with a petty, irresponsible attitude. This 
is not an innocuous position: given the present situation, which is genuinely 
disconcerting, any superficial attitude is guilty of “inciting thoughtlessness”, of 
undervaluing or completely disregarding  the concrete  and serious dangers that 
humanity currently has to deal with.  
                                                 
25 This double movement has only brought about development (really just apparent) in the 
West, but has involved the entire globe.  
26 As well as the two volumes of L’uomo è antiquato ‘, see the following for Anders: Der Mann 
auf der Brucke. Tagebuch aus Hiroshima und Nagasaki (1959) Italian translation by R. Solmi, 
Essere o non Essere Diaro aus Hiroshima e Nagasaki (preface by N. Bobbio), Torino, Enaudi, 
1961 ; Mensch ohne Welt. Schiften fur Kunst und Literatur (1984), Italian translation; Uomo 
senza mondo. Scritti sull’arte e la letteratura, edited by S. Velotti, Ferrara, Spazio Libri Edtori, 
1991.  
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If even minimal consideration is given to the current international reports 
drafted by the most diverse agencies  regarding the climatic, ecological, and social-
economic situation (mostly of western countries), a serious call for individual and 
collective responsibility is inevitable. There is no reasonable motivation for 
encouraging a “farewell to nature” (with or without a capital N)27. On the 
contrary: it is essential to direct every force, even the simplest and blandest, 
towards the greatest possible respect for what we consider in the world to be 
natural (even naive) and extra-machine. Furthermore, it would be advisable to 
abandon that widespread idea of existential superiority (and of eternity), the idea 
that man almost has the obligation (his privilege being so great) to bend the 
elements to his own volition, the misleading and perverse belief in pursuing the 
good of the human species even while compromising the existence of other living 
beings. The earth should preferably be conceived as our common “home”. Finally, 
it is worth trying by any means to recuperate a “responsible humanism”, in other 
words a serious assessment of the many strengths of man, and his potentialities as 
a knowing and willing being. In brief, an effort should be made to reorganize 
human existence, with a  “reorganicisation” (i.e. a reintroduction of the organic) 
and renaturalisation of life.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 As for example the booklet by G. Marrrone invites us to do, Addio alla Natura; Torino, Einaudi, 
2011. 
